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Abstract—The Netflix video streaming system is composed of
many interacting services. In such a large system, failures in
individual services are not uncommon. This paper describes
the Chaos Automation Platform, a system for running failure
injection experiments on the production system to verify that
failures in non-critical services do not result in system outages.
1. Introduction
To an end-user, Netflix is a single service that allows
them to stream television shows and movies over the Inter-
net. To the engineers who work for the company, Netflix is
a distributed system made up of many services that interact
via remote procedure call (RPC), sometimes referred to as
a microservice architecture [1].
In a large system such as Netflix, where hundreds of
services run on thousands of machines and engineers are
making changes every day, many things can go wrong.
Fortunately, many of the internal services that make up
Netflix are not critical for the user to be able to watch
a video. For example, a personalized list of recommenda-
tions and bookmarks that recall where you left off when
previously watching a video add value to the user, but if
the services that implement these features stop working, we
should still be able to provide a reasonable user experience.
Hodges describes this kind of graceful degradation as partial
availability [2].
Partial availability doesn’t come for free: engineers must
explicitly implement fallback behavior when making RPC
calls against non-critical services. If fallback behavior is not
implemented correctly, a problem in a non-critical service
can lead to an outage. This work addresses the following
question: how can we have confidence that Netflix users
will still be able to stream videos after non-critical services
have failed?
At Netflix, we practice Chaos Engineering [3]. Namely,
we believe there is a level of complexity in modern dis-
tributed systems that is chaotic, and that a chief architect
cannot hold all of the system’s moving parts in their head.
Chaos Engineering is about engineering practices that help
us surface systemic effects, as embodied by the Principles
of Chaos Engineering [4].
In particular, we believe that to have maximum confi-
dence you must test in your production environment with
live traffic. Chaos Monkey [5] is one example of Chaos
Engineering in practice at Netflix. Another example is
automated canary analysis [6], which tests new code in
the production environment with live traffic. Unfortunately,
canary analysis is not guaranteed to test the code paths
associated with dealing with failures in non-critical services.
Another tenet of Chaos Engineering is automation: we want
an automated solution for ensuring the system is resilient to
failures in non-critical services.
This paper describes our proposed solution: the Chaos
Automation Platform, or ChAP. ChAP enables engineering
teams to run Chaos Engineering experiments on live traffic
in production in order to build confidence that their service
will degrade gracefully when non-critical downstream ser-
vices fail.
ChAP works by diverting a fraction of production traffic,
injecting failures into the diverted traffic, and checking that
the system behaves as expected. Section 4 describes how an
engineer would use ChAP to verify that Netflix is resilient
to failures in a particular service.
2. Individual service failures vs system-level
failures
As Hodges notes, “distributed systems are different be-
cause they fail often” [2]. When a system runs on thousands
of servers, it becomes very likely that something will go
wrong somewhere.
A simple example of a failure is a bug that results in an
unhandled exception1, such as a null pointer exception. In
Netflix’s microservice architecture, an unhandled exception
results in a service returning an HTTP 500 error code [7].
There are other failure modes that are common for
an individual service in a microservice architecture. One
common problem is resource exhaustion. Examples of finite
resources on a server include memory, disk space, CPU cy-
cles, threads, and open TCP/IP connections. When a server
runs out of one of these resources, system calls that would
normally succeed may block or throw exceptions. Resource
exhaustion can be caused by a resource leak, but it may also
occur if the load on a server exceeds its capacity. Here the
problem is that the service has been insufficiently scaled:
not enough servers have been allocated to that service.
1. At Netflix, most services are implemented in Java, which uses excep-
tions for error signaling.
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Figure 1. Unexpected fallback behavior
When a server runs low on one of its resources, one
symptom is an increase in the average response time of
the server. For example, memory pressure on a server may
lead to garbage collection pauses. Another example: for a
service that allocates one thread-per-request, if the number
of pending requests exceeds the number of available threads,
latency will increase.
Yet another issue is the environment that these ser-
vices run in. All of the Netflix services run within the
Amazon Web Services Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2),
an infrastructure-as-a-service cloud computing environment
[8]. Because cloud providers such as EC2 compete on
price, in order to reduce costs they use commodity-grade
hardware instead of more reliable enterprise-grade hardware.
This increases the likelihood of an individual server failing
because of hardware issues. Transient networking issues
such as latency spikes are also not uncommon in cloud com-
puting environments. When deploying to a cloud computing
platform, it is the responsibility of the software engineers to
design systems that incorporate redundancy to compensate
for occasional failures in hardware.
Individual service failures are inevitable, and Netflix
engineers leverage the Hystrix [9] library to implement
fallback logic to handle failures in downstream services. Our
goal is to prevent system-level failures. In particular, our
goal is to reduce the likelihood of an outage, when Netflix
customers are not able to stream videos. The primary metric
of system health at Netflix is the number of video stream
starts per second, internally referred to as SPS [10].
A failure of an individual service can lead to a drop in
SPS if the client calling the service does not have proper
fallbacks in place. A study by Yuan et al. revealed that
92% of catastrophic system failures happened because of
incorrect error-handling logic [11].
Even if fallback logic is present in a client, the failure
of a non-critical service may still lead to a system-level
failure due to cascading effects. Consider the following
failure scenario, illustrated in Figure 1.
Typically, service A calls service B. For some reason,
C starts to become overloaded, and returns errors to B.
The fallback behavior for B is not working correctly, which
causes B to return errors. A detects a problem and calls C
as a fallback. Fallback behavior that should have alleviated
the load on C instead increased the load on C, accelerating
the problem and resulting in an outage.
We believe that ChAP will help us identify these kinds
of failure modes before they result in outages.
Figure 2. Services in the request path when calling Gallery
3. Example of a non-critical service: gallery
When a user logs in to Netflix, they are presented with
rows of images, called galleries, that represent video con-
tent. Each gallery represents a different category. Examples
of galleries include:
• Trending Now
• Recently Added
• Critically-acclaimed Comedies
• TV Dramas
The list of galleries and the contents of the gallery are
personalized for each Netflix user: different users will be
shown different galleries.
The Gallery microservice is responsible for generating
the galleries. If this service stops working, the client that
calls the Gallery service must return a sensible fallback. For
example, it may return an older gallery that is present in a
local cache. Or, it may return a gallery that is not personal-
ized for the particular user. From the user’s perspective, the
Netflix interface should still appear to be working properly,
even if the content presented to the user is stale or not fully
personalized.
Figure 2 shows the request path for requests that ulti-
mately reach the Gallery service. The first service in the
request path is Zuul [12], a reverse-proxy that serves as the
front-door to Netflix. Next in the request path is a service
called API [13]. API contains the Gallery client library that
makes calls against the Gallery service. It is this client
library that is responsible for serving fallbacks in the event
that the Gallery service fails. To verify that this fallback
behavior works correctly, we must inject failures on the calls
from API to Gallery.
4. Running a ChAP experiment
Consider the following scenario: Alice, a (fictional) QA
engineer on the Gallery team, wants to verify that Netflix is
resilient to failures in the Gallery service. She uses ChAP’s
web interface to define an experiment. Because ChAP injects
failures on the client side of the request, she selects the
API server group as the subject of the experiment. She
specifies that all calls to the Gallery service should fail.
She chooses to divert only a small amount of traffic for this
experiment: 0.3%. She chooses a duration of 30 minutes for
the experiment.
Finally, she selects the metrics that she is interested
in observing for the experiment. She chooses a number of
Hystrix commands to track for the experiment. Hystrix is a
library that allows engineers to wrap RPC calls and specify
what the fallback behavior should be if an RPC call fails.
Each Hystrix command has a name, e.g.: “GetGallery”.
For each Hystrix command, for the control and experi-
ment server groups, ChAP will display counts of:
• successful requests served
• successful fallbacks served
• failed fallbacks served
An example set of plots for the GetGallery Hystrix
command is shown in Figure 3.
Alice expects to see a large number of successful re-
quests served in the control group, and a large number of
successful fallbacks served in the experiment group.
Once the experiment starts, the following things happen,
as depicted in Figure 4.
ChAP creates two new server groups, named api-chap-
control and api-chap-experiment. The servers in these two
new groups are deployed with the same software as the
servers in the api server group.
Of all of the requests that are destined for the API
services, 99.7% are routed to the original API server group,
0.15% are routed to the api-chap-control group, and 0.15%
are routed to the api-chap-experiment group. In the api-chap-
experiment group, all of the RPC calls to the Gallery service
fail immediately with an error.
ChAP presents Alice with a dashboard that plots the
metrics specified by user for the control and experiment
groups. The dashboard also shows the SPS for each group.
By comparing the metrics between the two groups, Alice can
determine whether the system is handling Gallery failures
correctly.
5. Implementation details
ChAP uses an internally developed system called FIT
[14] to cause RPC calls between microservices to fail. FIT
is only able to inject two types of failures: an error response
and an increase in latency. However, from the point of view
of a client making a call to a service, a large number of
problems that can occur in an individual service manifest as
either an error response or a response delay. Hence, ChAP
can model many types of real failures in individual services.
ChAP works by coordinating among many existing
systems inside of Netflix. In addition to FIT, ChAP in-
teracts with Hystrix [9] (fault tolerance), Spinnaker [15]
(deployment), Eureka [16] (service discovery), Zuul [12]
(reverse-proxy), Archaius [17] (dynamic configuration man-
agement), Ribbon [18] (interprocess communication), Atlas
[19] (telemetry) and Mantis [20] (stream processing).
6. Current status and future work
ChAP is still under heavy development, with a few
teams inside of Netflix currently test-driving the system and
providing feedback. Our ultimate goal is to be able to detect
automatically whether a service is resilient to failure rather
than relying on a human looking at dashboards and making a
judgment. We also plan to integrate ChAP into the Spinnaker
deployment system so that ChAP experiments can be started
automatically as part of the deployment process.
There are failures that FIT (and, hence, ChAP) cannot
currently model. We can only inject failures in the request
path, in requests that originate from a Netflix client device.
In particular, we cannot yet inject failures in calls between
services that are occur during the startup of a service.
Finally, while we use SPS as our health metric, what we
are ultimately concerned about is the user experience. In the
future, we hope to use information from client devices to
get more accurate information on the impact of a ChAP
experiment on a user.
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